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This article describes some results of a successful attempt to assess and refine a causal model of the general conditions of several forms of civil strife, using cross-sectional analyses of data collected for 114 polities. The theoretical argument, which is discussed in detail elsewhere, stipulates a set of variables said to determine the likelihood and magnitude of civil ~t r i f e .~ Considerable effort was given here to devising indices that represent the theoretical variables more closely than the readily-available aggregate indices often used in quantitative cross-national research. One consequence is an unusually high degree of statistical explanation: measures of five independent variables jointly account for twothirds of the variance among nations in magnitude of civil strife (R=.80, R2= .64).
I t should be noted a t the outset that this study does not attempt to isolate the set of conditions that leads specifically to LLrevolution," nor to assess the social or political impact of any given act of strife except as that impact is reflected in measures of "magnitude" of strife. The relevance of this kind of research to the classic concern of political scholarship with revolution is its attempt a t identification and systematic analysis of conditions that dispose men to strife generally, revolution included.
I. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The basic theoretical proposition is that a psychological variable, relative deprivation, is the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind, and that the more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one or another form. Relative deprivation is defined as actors' perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations (the goods and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capabilities (the amounts of those goods and conditions that they think they are able to get and keep). The underlying causal mechanism is derived from psychological theory and evidence to the effect that one innate response to perceived deprivation is discontent or anger, and that anger is a motivating state for which aggression is an inherently satisfying response. The term relative deprivation is used below to denote the perceived discrepancy, discontent to denote the motivating state which is the postulated response to it. The relationship between discontent and participation in strife is however mediated by a number of intervening social conditions. The initial theoretical model stipulated three such societal variables that are explored here, namely coercive potential, institutionalization, and social facilitation.3 Results of a previous attempt to operationalize Coercive potential is labelled "retribution" in ibid. The theoretical model also stipulates a set of variables that determines the intensity of deprivation. In the research reported in the present article, deprivation was operationaliaed directly rather than by reference to its component variables. The causal mechanism of the theory is the frustration-aggression relationship, which the author has attempted to modify and apply to collective strife in the light of recent empirical and theoretical work, e.g., Leonard Berkowi'ta, Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962) , and Aubrey J. Yates, Frustration and Conflict (New York: Wiley, 1962 some of these variables and relate them to strife suggested that a fourth variable whose effects should be controlled is the legitimacy of the political regime in which strife occur^.^ The initial model, sketched in simplified form in Figure 1 , specified no hierarchical or causal interactions among the mediating variables. Each was assumed to have an independent effect on the fundamental relationship between deprivation and strife. The theoretical arguments with reference to each variable are briefly stated here.
Great importance is attributed in psychological theory and equally, in theoretical and empirical studies of revolutionary behavior, to the inhibiting effects of punishment or coercion, actual or threatened, on the outcome of deprivation. The relationship is not necessarily a linear one whereby increasing levels of coercion are associated with declining levels of violence. Psychological evidence suggests that if an aggressive response to deprivation is thwarted by fear of punishment, this interference is itself a deprivation and increases the instigation to aggression. Comparative studies of civil strife suggest a curvilinear relationship whereby medium levels of coercion, indexed for example by military participation ratios or ratings of regime repressiveness, are associated with the highest magnitudes of strife. Only very high levels of coercion appear to limit effectively the extent of ~t r i f e .Ño systematic comparative study has examined OF CIVIL STRIFE 1105 whether the curvilinear relationship also holds for levels of coercion actually applied. Comparative studies have, however, emphasized the importance of the loyalty of coercive forces to the regime as a factor of equal or greater importance than the size of those forces in deterring strife, and this relationship is almost certainly linear, i.e., the greater the loyalty of coercive forces, the more effective they are, ceteris paribus, in deterring strife.6 Two measures of coercion are used in this study: coercive force size, which is hypothesized to vary curvilinearly with levels of strife, and coercive force size weighted for the degree of loyalty of coercive forces to the regime, referred to throughout as coercive potential, which is expected to have a linear relationship with strife.
The second intervening variable is institutionalization, i.e., the extent to which societal structures beyond the primary level are broad in scope, command substantial resources and/ or personnel, and are stable and persisting. Representative of the diverse arguments about the role of associational structures in minimizing strife are Huntington on the necessity of political institutionalization for political stability, Mornhauser on the need for structures intervening between mass and elite to minimize mass movements, and a variety of authors on the long-range tendencies of labor organizations to minimize violent economically-based ~o n f l i c t .Two underlying psychological processes are likely to affect the intensity of and responses to discontent. One is that the existence of such structures increases men's value opportunities, i.e., their repertory of alternative ways to attain value satisfaction. A complementary function is that of displacement: labor unions, political parties, and a range of other associations may provide the discontented with routinized and typically non-violent means for expressing their disc o n t e n t~.The proposed relationship is linear: the greater the institutionalization, the lower the magnitude of strife is likely to be.
Given the existence of widespread discontent in a population, a great number of social and environmental conditions may be present that facilitate the outbreak and persistence of strife. They may be categorized according to their inferred psychological effects, for example, according to whether they facilitate interaction among the discontented, or provide the discontented with a sense that violent responses to deprivation are justified, or give them the means to make such responses with maximum effect, or shelter them from retribution.9 Two aspects of facilitation are treated separately in this study: past levels of.civi1 strije and social and structural facilitation per se. The theoretical basis for the first of these variables is that populations in which strife is chronic tend to develop, by an interaction process, a set of beliefs justifying violent responses to deprivation; the French tradition of urban "rev~lution'ĩs a striking example. Social and structural facilitation (referred to below as "facilitation") comprises aspects of organizational and environmental facilitation of strife, and the provision of external assistance. The operational hypotheses are that the greater the levels of past strife, and of social and structural facilitation, the greater is the magnitude of strife.
Two considerations suggested the incorporation of the fourth intervening variable examined in this study, legitimacy of the regime. A study of strife for the years 1961-1963 identified a number of nations that had less strife than might be expected on the basis of characteristics they shared with more strife-ridden polities.10 One apparent common denominator among them was a high degree of popular support for the regime. This appeared consistent with Mereln~an's recently-proposed learning-theory rationale for legitimacy, to the effect that people comply with directives of the regime in order to gain both the symbolic rewards of governmental action and the actual rewards with which government first associated itself, an argument that applies equally well to acceptance of deprivation and is compatible with experimental findings, in work on the frustration-aggression relationship, that people are less aggressive when they perceive frustration to be reasonable or justifiahle.ll
Ibid.
l o Gurr and Ruttenberg, The Conditions of Civil Violence . . . , 100-106. "Richard M. Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," this REVIEW, 60 (September 1966) ; see also the work of Pastore and of Kregarman and Worchel, reviewed in Berkowitz, op. cit., passim.
The proposed relationship of legitimacy as an intervening variable is linear: the greater is regime legitimacy a t a given level of deprivation, the less the magnitude of consequent strife,
OPERATIOhTAL RIEASURES
The universe of analysis chosen for evaluating the model comprised 114 distinct national and colonial political entities, each of which had a population of one million or more in 1962.12 Data on civil strife were collected for 1961 through 1965. Cross-sectional multiple and partial correlation techniques were used. The use of product-moment correlation coefficients was justified on grounds of their necessity for multiple regression, although not all the indicators formally meet the order-of-measurement requirements of the techniques used.
Because of the very considerable difficulties of operationalizing a number of the variables, and the fact that most of the indicators constructed are new, this article gives relatively close attention to the data collection and scaling procedures.
With the exception of magnitude of strife and its components, the underlying variables examined in this study are unmeasured and must be inferred from indicators. I n most instances they are in fact unineasureable by aggregate data, since they relate in the instance of deprivation-induced discontent to a state of mind, and in the case of the intervening variables to conditions that have their effect only insofar as the discontented perceive them, and moreover perceive them as relevant to their response to deprivation. Following Blalock's recommendation that "when dealing with unmeasured variables it will usually be advisable to make use of more than one indicator for each underlying variable," each of the summary measures used in this study is derived by combining two to seven indicators of the underlying variable. This procedure has not only the advantage Blalock attributes to it, namely of minimizing the effects of confounding variables, but also facilitates incorporation of various empirically-discrete conditions that have theoretically-identical effects.13 '2 Five polities meeting these criteria were excluded: Laos on grounds that at no time in the 1960's did it have even the forms of a unified regime, and Albania, Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam for lack of sufficient reliable data. The universe nonetheless includes polities with more than 98 percent of the world's population. 
Magnitude of Civil Strife
T h e dependent variable of t h e theoretical model is magnitude of civil strife. Civil strife is defined a s all collective, nongovernmental attacks on persons or property t h a t occur within the boundaries of a n autonomous or colonial political unit. B y "nongovernmental" is meant acts by subject, and citizens who are not employees or agents of t h e regime, as well as acts of such enlployees or agents contrary t o role norms, such as mutinies and coups d'6tat. Operationally the definition is qualified by t h e inclusion of synibolic demonstrative attacks on political person, or policies, e.g., political demonstrations, and by the exclusion of turmoil and internal war events in which less than 100 persons take part.
A three-fold typology of civil strife is also employed, based on a n empirical typology of civil strife events identified b y Rummel, Tanter, and others in a serieb of factor analyses. T h e general categories, and representative subcategories, are
(1) Turmoil: relatively spontaneous, unstructured mass strife, including demonstrations, political strikes, riots, political clashes, and localized rebellions. (2) Conspirac!l: intensively organized, relatively small-scale civil strife, including political assassinations, small-scale terrorism, small-scale guerrilla wars, coups, mutinies, and plots and purges, the last two on grounds that they are evidence of planned strife. (3) Internal war: large-scale, organized, focused civil strife, almost always accompanied by extensive violence, including large-scale terrorism and guerrilla wars, civil wars, private wars, and large-scale revolts."
l4 In each of a number of analyses by Rummel and others a set of "domestic conflict" measures was factor analyzed. Turmoil, indexed by riots and demonstrations, is found to be a distinct dimension in all the analyses; two other factors, labelled by Rummel L'revolution" and "subversion," are in some cases separate and in others combined. Print ipal components of the "revolution" dimension are coups, palace revolutions, plots, and purgcs; the category is labelled here conspiracy. Guerrilla war and terrorism are major components of the "subversion" dimension, here labelled internal war. See Rudolph J. Various measures of t h e relative extent of civil strife have been used in recent literature, among them counts by country of number of strife events of various types, factor scores derived from such typologies, number of deaths from violent strife, man-days of participation in strife, and scaling procedures t h a t take account of both number of events and their severity.15 One can infer from frustrationaggression theory t h a t no single measure of magnitude of aggression, individual or collective, is likely t o be sufficient. It is likely t h a t high levels of discontent may b e expressed either in intense, short-lived violence or i n more protracted b u t less severe strife. Moreover, t h e proportion of a collectivity t h a t participates i n civil strife ought to vary with t h e modal intensity of discontent: mild discontent will motivate few t o participate, whereas rage is likely to galvanize large segments of a collectivity into action.
Three aspects of civil strife thus ought t o be taken into account in specifying its magnitude:
(1) Pervasiveness: the extent of participation by the affected population, operationally defined for this study as the sum of the estimated number of participants in all acts of strife as a proportion of the total population of each polity, expressed in terms of participants per 100,000 popu1a. Many small-scale strife events, and some larger ones, probably went unreported in these sources and hence are not included in this civil strife data bank. Moreover, much reported and estimated data is in varying degrees inaccurate. However, neither random nor systematic error seen1 sufficient to affect in any substantial way the analyses or conclusions reported here; the data are adequate for the purposes to which they are put.17 l6 Information coded, in addition to that required for the three measures specified, included the socio-economic class(es) of the initiators, the social context in which they acted, the category of events, the targets and apparent motives of action, the number and role of coercive forces, and the extent and types of external support for initiators and regime, if any. Although no formal reliability tests were undertaken, the four coders did extensive practice coding on the same set of materials prior to coding and reviewed points of disagreement, and the author reviewed all coding sheets for internal consistency and, where necessary, recoding or search for additional information. I t should be noted that the 1100 "events" include many cumulated reports, e.g., civil rights demonstrations in the U.S. were treated as a single set of events, all European-OAS terrorism in Algeria as a single event, etc.
'7 I t has been suggested that strife in countries with press restrictions is under-reported. As a check on this type of systematic error a nine-point measure of press freedom was incorporated in initial analyses; the measure is from Raymond B. Nixon, "Freedom in the World's Press: A Fresh Appraisal With New Data," Journalism Quarinitiators serve as examples. The coding sheet itself contained two "number of initiator" scales. The first was a modified geometric progression of two used to record proximate estimates of initiators, its first interval being 1 to 40, its highest 55,001 to 110,000; for purposes of summing such estimates to obtain total number of initiators, the midpoint of each interval was used. The second scale was used for recording rough estimates, sometimes coder estimates, of number of initiators, ranging from "less than 100" (set equal to 40 for purposes of computing totals) to "10,001 to 100,000" (set equal to 40,000). Data for events for which no estimate could be made were suppliecl by calculating and inserting means for the appropriate subcategory of event, e.g., if a riot was coded "no basis for judging" for number of initiators, it was assigned the average number of initiators of all riots for which estimates were available.
"Duration" posed little difficulty, being coded on a geometric progression whose first two intervals were "one-half day or less" and "one-half to one day," and whose upper intervals were four to nine months, nine to fifteen months, etc. Yo event was assigned a duration of more than five years, though some began before and/or persisted after the 1961-1965 period.
Casualties were coded similarly to number of initiators, the principal missing-data component being estimates of injuries. The ratio of injuries to deaths was calculated for all events of each subcategory for which both data were available-the general ratio for all wellreported strife being 12:1-and was used to estimate injuries for all such events for which "deaths" but not injuries estimates were given.ls terly (Winter 1965), 3-14. The correlations of this measure, in which high scores reflect low press freedom, with some measures of strife are: Duration, +19; Intensity, $17; Pervasiveness, -16; Total magnitude of strife, +11. The first two are significant at the .05 level, the third at .lo. In effect, more strife tends to be reported from polities with low press freedom, not less, as might be expected. The results almost certainly reflect the association of high levels of economic development and press freedom in the Western nations, which tend to have less strife than the developing nations.
'8 The missing-data procedures gave implausibly-high estimates for initiators and casualties for Strife events occurred in 104 of the 114 polities during the 1961-65 period. Pervasiveness, Duration, and Intensity scores were calculated separately, following the guidelines specified a b o~e , for turmoil, conspiracy, and internal n-ar for each country, and for all strife taken together for each polity. All the distributions were highly skewed, hence were subjected to a log ( X + l ) transformation. To obtain cornbilled magnitude scores for turmoil, conspiracy, internal war, and all strife, the three component logged scores were added, divided by eight to obtain their eighth root, and the anti-log used as the polity magnitudeof-strife score. The distributions remained skewed, but ~~lbstantially so only in the case of internal war, which by our definitions occurred in only 25 of the 114 polities.lg
Jft7asures of Deprivation
A very large number of conditions are likely to impose some degree of relative deprivation on some proportion of a nation's citizens. Similarly, all men are likely to be discontented about some of their conditions of life a t some point in time. On the basis of prior theoretical and empirical work, however, it was possible to construct, and subsequently to combine, a set of cro.5-n:~tionally comparable indices of conditions that by inference cause pervasive and intense types of deprivation, relying in part on aggregate data and in part on indices constructed by coding narrative and historical material. I n the initial stages of data collection a large number of measures nere constructed, some of tlienl representing short-term and some persisting conditions, some of each relatins to economic, political, and sociocultural deprivation. Whenever possible, separate measures were included of the intensity of inferred deprivation and of its pervasiveness, i.e., of the proportion of population presumably affected, plus a third measure combining the two elements. A correlation matrix for 48 such measures and a variety of strife measures was generated, and 13 representative deprivation measures selected c o m b i n a t i~n .~for The general rationale for the two general types of measures, short-term and persisting cleprivation, and the measures finally selected, are summarized below.
Persisting Deprivation: I n the very long run men's expectations about the goods ant1 conditions of life to which they are entitled tend to adjust to what they are capable of attaining. I n the shorter span, however, some groups may persistently demand and expect values, such as greater economic opportunity, political autonomy, or freedom of religious expression, that their societies will not or cannot provide.
( 1 ) Economic discrimination is defined as systematic exclusion of social groups from higher economic value positions on ascriptive bases. For each polity the proportion of population so discriminated against, if :my, was specified to the nearest .05, and the intensity of deprivation coded on a fourpoint scale (see below). The proportion and the intensity score were multiplied to obtain a polity score. (2) Political d?>crimination is similarly defined in terms of systematic limitation in form, norm, or practice of bocial groups' opportunities to participate in political activities or to attain ellte positions on thc basis of ascribed characteristics. Proportionality and intensity scores were determined and combined in the same manner as economic discrimination scores. The "intensity" scales were defined as follows:
Most higher economic value positions, or Some significant political elite positions are some specific classes of economic activity, closed to the group, or some participatory are closed to the group. a number of events. In subsequent and comparable analysis it seems advisable to rely on estimates of deaths alone, rather than casualties, and to insert means derived from comparable events i n comparable cou9itries rather than such events in all countries.
19 Tables are available on request from the author listing the 114 countries, their strife scores, the summary measures of deprivation and meactivities (party membership, voting, etc.). diating conditions discussed below, and the data sources.
20 The 48 deprivation measures, with only one statistically significant exception, were positively associated with strife, most of them at a relatively low level. The thirteen were selected with regard to their representativeness, relatively high correlations with the dependent variables, and low intercorrelations. The separatist region or group was incorporated in the polity by its own request or mutual agreement.
2
The separatist region or group was assigned to the polity by international agreement or by fiat of a former colonial or governing power, except when (3) or (4) below holds.
3
The separatist region or group was forcibly assimilated into the polity prior to the twentieth century, or was forcibly conquered by a former colonial power prior to the twentieth century.
4
The separatist region or group was forcibly assimilated into the polity during the twentieth century, or was forcibly reassimilated in the twentieth century after a period of autonomy due to rebellion or other circumstance. ( 4 ) Dependence on private foreign capital, indexed by negative net factor payments abroad as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product in the late 1 9 5 0 '~~ is assumed to be a chronic source of dissatisfaction in an era characterized by economic nationalism. The greater the proportion of national product that accrues to foreign suppliers of goods or capital, the greater the inferred intensity of deprivation; the extent of such deprivation was assumed equal to the proportion of population engaged in the monetary economy. The polity score is the extent score X the intensity sc0re.~2 ( 5 ) Religious cleavages are a chronic source of deprivation-inducing conflict. The scale for intensity of religious cleavage takes account both of number of organized religious groups with two percent or more of total population (the major Christian and Muslim subdivisions are counted as separate groups) and of the duration of their coexistence, the greater that duration the less the inferred intensity. The extent measure is the proportion of the population belonging to any organized religious group. The polity score is the product of the two scores. ( 6 ) Lack of educational opportunity was indexed, in proportionality terms only, by subtracting primary plus secondary school enrollment ratios ca. 1960 from 100. Education is so widely regarded as a n essential first step for individual socio-economic advancement that one can infer deprivation among the uneducated, and among the parents of children who cannot attend school if not yet among the children themselves.
Six indicators of persisting deprivation were several strife measures ranging from .09 to .27.
combined to obtain a single long-run depriva-T o combine them they were weighted t o bring tion measure. their means into approximate correspondence, These six measures all had distributions ap-and each polity's scores added and then proaching normality, and correlations with averaged t o circumvent the missing d a t a problem. Coding judgments for both discrimination indices and for separatism were made on the basis Xhort-Term Deprivation: Any sharp increase of country studies. The proportionality measures in peoples' expectations t h a t is unaccompanied are versions of indices reported in Ted Gurr, b y t h e perception of a n increase in value capa- 67-90. deprivation. We inferred t h a t short-term, rela-22 A crude measure of the proportion of each tive declines in system economic and political polity's population engaged in the monetary performance were likely t o be perceived as economy, to the nearest .lo, was constructed for increased deprivation for substantial numbers the purpose of weighting this and some other of people. Indices were devised of five kinds of measures. The measure was based primarily on short-term economic deprivation and two of labor census data.
political deprivation.
(1) Short-term trends i n trade value, 1957-60 compared with 1950-57: The percentage change of trade value, exports+imports, for 1957-60 was compared with the rate for 1950-1957, and any relative decrease in the later period was treated as a n indicator of short-term economic deprivation. 1)ecreases were scaled so that polities with lower rates of increase in the earlier period received greater deprivation scores than those with high rates. ( 2 ) Short-term trends in trade value, 1960 Short-term trends in trade value, -63 compared with 1950 The score for each such condition is the product of the extent and intensity scores; the score for each polity for each year is the sum of the "condition" scores; and the score used for the summary index is the sum of annual scores for 1960 through 1963. The sources used were Ilispanic-American Report for Latin America and the Annual Register for other polities.24 (6) N e w restrictions on polztical participation and representation by the regime were coded from the same sources for the same years. Seventeen types of action were defined on a priori grounds as valuedepriving political restrictions, including harrassment and banning of parties of various sizes, banning of political activity, and improper dismissal of elected assemblies and executives. These were ranked on a nine-point intensity scale.25 The extent measure was the politically-participatory proportiorl of the population, crudely estimated to the nearest .10 on the basis of voting participa- 23 The two measures will be used in subsequent United Nations sources, was converted to U.S.
Banning of minority party
currency when necessary to maintain comparabil-3 Amalgamation of a major party with another major party ity over time. term provision for reelection tion levels and, in lieu of yoting data, on the basis of urbanization and literacy levels. The score for each action identified is the product of the intensity and extent scores; the annual polity score the sum of "action" scores; and the summary index the sum of annual scores for 1960-63.
(7) New valz~e-depriving policies of governments were defined as any new programs or actions that appeared to take away some significant proportion of attained values from a numerically or socially significant group, for example land reform, tax increases, restrictions on trade, limitations of civil liberties, restrictive actions against ethnic, religious, or economic groups, and so forth. Two aspects of such policies were taken into account in scaling for intensity: the degree of deprivation imposed, and their equality of application. The ''degree of deprivation" scale values are: small = 1, moderate = 2, substantial =3, most or all =4. The "equality of application" scale values are: uniform = 1, discriminatory = 2. The intensity score is the product of values on these two scales. The most intensely depriving policies are assumed to be those intentionally discriminatory and designed to deprive the affected group of most or all the relevant value, e.g. seizure of all property of absentee landlords without compensation (score =8). Deprivation is inferred to be least intense if the policy is uniformly applicable to all the affected class of citizens and deprives them of only a small part of the value, e.g. a five percent increase in corporation tax rates (score = 1). The extent measure is a crude estimate of the proportion of the adult population likely to be directly affected, the permissible values being .01, .02, .05, .lo, .20, .40, .60, .80 and 1.00. The score for each policy identified is the product of the intensity and extent scores; the annual polity score the sum of "policy" scores; and the summary index the sum of annual scores for 1960-63. The sources are the same as for (6) and (7).26
Three summary short-term deprivation coercive-force participation in strife in the scores were calculated for each polity from 1960-65 period.
these seven indices. T h e five economic vari-T h e rationale for t h e five-point coerciveables were multiplied b y constants so t h a t force loyalty scale, below, is t h a t the more their means were approximately equal and recently coercive forces had attacked the averaged t o circumvent t h e missing-data regime, the less efficacious they would be perproblem. This is t h e "short-term economic ceived t o be b y those who might initiate deprivation" index referred t o below. T h e sum-strife-and the more likely they might be t o mary measures of politically-related depriva-d o so again themselves. Countries were scored tion were similarly combined t o obtain a on the basis of information from a variety of summary ('short-term political deprivation" historical sources. measure. T h e two measures were then added t o comprise a single "short-term deprivation" For 28 polities that became independent after 1957 no "loyalty" score was assigned unless the military or police did in fact intervene between independence and the end of 1960. For purposes of calculating the summary score, below, a military loyalty score for these polities was derived from the "legitimacy" score. Insofar as the military or police themselves illicitly initiated strife in the 1961-65 period, they lost all deterrent effect. To quantify the extent of such involvement, all military or police participation in strife was determined from the data bank of 1100 events and for each polity a "coercive forces strife participation" score calculated, by weighting each involvement in a mutiny or a turmoil event as one and each involvement in any other event (typically coups and civil wars) as two, and summing for each country.
Loyalty
All four of the "coercive potential" measures were correlated in the predicted direction with several preliminary measures of strife levels. The participation ratios had low but consistently negative correlations with strife; the llloyalty" and "strife participation" indices had correlations of the order of -40 and +40 with strife The r e s p e c t i~e l y .~~ composite "coercive potential" score was calculated by the following formula:
Coercive potential = 10.
14-p where L = "loyalty" score;
HiR =the higher of the scaled military and security forces participation ratios;%S loR= the lower of the participation ratios; and P = "coercive forces strife participation" score.
The effect of the formula is to give the highest coercive potential scores to countries with large coercive forces characterized by both historical and concurrent loyalty to the regime. The more recently and extensively such 21 These are product-moment correlation coefficients, the strife measures including measures of duration, pervasiveness, intensity, and total magnitude of strife for 1961-65. The last two strife measures are defined differently from those employed in the present analysis, but are derived from the same 1100-event data bank.
28 If one or the other ratio was missing, it was assumed equal to the known ratio. Internal security force ratios for 94 polities are reported in Gurr, New Error-Compensated Measures for Comparing Nations, 111-126.
forces have been involved in strife, however, the lower their coercive potential score.
A second coercion measure was included in the final analysis to permit a further test of the curvilinearity hypothesis. The measure used is the expression in brackets in the coercive potential formula above, i.e., a weighted measure of the relative sizes of military and internal security forces (coercive force size).
Institutionalization: Indices of institutional strength and stability which I found in previous analyses to be negatively associated with strife are the ratio of labor u n i o n membership to nonagricultural employnzent, central government budgeted expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, ca. 1962 , and the stability of the political party system.29 A ten-interval geometric progression was used to normalize the first of these indices, the second was multiplied by 100 and rounded to the nearest 10. To index characteristics of party systems two scales were used, one relating to the number of parties, the other to party system stability per se: Scores on these two scales were combiiled on an 8-point scale using party stability as the primary indicator of institutionalization but giving highest scores a t each stability level to systems with larger numbers of party structures. The summary institutionalization measure was constructed using this formula:
where hiI=the highest of the three institutionalization scores, etc. This procedure gives greatest weight to the most institutionalized sector of society on the assumption that high institutionalization in one sector compensates for lower levels in others. The highest scores are attained by the Eastern European Communist states while the scores of the Western European democracies are slightly lower. The lowest-scoring polities are Ethiopia, Haiti, Nepal, and Yemen.
Facilitation: Two aspects of facilitation were indexed separately: past levels of civil strife and "social and structural facilitation" per se. The "past levels of strife" measure was derived from the Eckstein data on frequency of internal wars of various types in the period 1946-59; although its reliability is only moderate it covers a longer period and a larger number of polities than other available data.30 Data were collected for those of the 114 polities not included in the Eckstein tabulation, using the same procedure, a N e w Y o r k T i m e s Index count, and recollected for a few others. Weights were assigned to events in various categories, e.g. riots= I , coups =5, and a summary score for each polity calculated. The distribution was normalized with a log (X+ 1) transformation.
The terrain and transportation network of a country constitute a basic structural limitation on the capabilities of insurgents for maintaining a durable insurrection. A complex "inaccessibility" index was constructed taking account of the extent of transportation net- works related to area, population density, and the extent of waste, forest, and mountainous terrain; the highest inaccessibility scores were received by polities like Bolivia, Sudan, and Yemen, which have limited transportation networks and large portions of rugged terrain. 31 A crucial L'social" variable that facilitates strife is the extent to which the discontented can and do organize for collective action. The relative strength of Communist Party organizations was used as a partial index, taking into account both the number of party members per 10,000 population and the status of the party. Unfortunately no comparable data could be obtained for extremist parties of the right. Party-membership ratios were rescaled to an 11-point scale based on a geometric progression of 2. The party status scale, below, is based on the premise that illegal parties are more facilitative of strife because their membership is likely, because of the exigencies of repression, to be more dedicated, better organized, and committed to the more violent forms of conflict. Pactionalized parties are assumed to be more facilitative because they offer more numerous organizational foci for action.
Score Communist party status and characteristics
0
In power or nonexistent. The score for each polity is the scaled membership ratio times the party status score. The third measure of facilitation is the extent of external support for initiators of strife in the 1961-65 period. Each strife event in the 1100-event data bank was coded for the degree of support for initiators (if any) and for the number of nations supporting the initiators in any of these ways. The scale points for "degree of support" are provision of arms and supplies ( = I), refuge ( =2), facilities and training ( =3), military advisors and mercenaries (=4), and large (1,000+) military units ( = 5 ) . The event support score is the "degree" score times the "number of nations" score, these scores then being summed for all events for each polity to obtain a polity score. This measure alone has a relatively high correlation with strife level measures, ranging from .3 to .4; its two extreme outliers, South Vietnam and the Congo, are also among the three extreme outliers on the total magnitude of strife distribution.
The three social and structural facilitation measures were weighted to bring their means into approximate correspondence, several missing-data items estimated, and the weighted measures added to obtain the composite index.
Legitimacy:
The legitimacy of a regime can be defined behaviorally in terms of popular compliance, and psychologically by reference to the extent to which its directives are regarded by its citizens as properly made and worthy of obedience. I n lieu of evidence on compliance or allegiance necessary to operationalize the concept directly, I combined one indicator of an inferred cause of legitimacy, the circumstances under which the regime attained its present form, with an indicator of an inferred effect, the durability of the regime. The "character" of the regime was scored on a seven-point scale: One-half to one generation (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) . 2
Character Score Origins of national political institutions
One-quarter to one-half generation (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) Examples of coding decisions about "major reformations" are that Prance experienced such a change in 1957; that most French tropical African polities date their basic institutional structures from the 1946 reforms, not the year of formal independence; that the Canadian regime dates from 1867, when dominion status was attained; and that many Latin American regimes, despite performance of musical chairs a t the executive level, attained their basic institutional structures a t various (historically specified and coded) points in the mid-or late nineteenth century.
The summary legitimacy index was constructed by summing and rescaling the "character" and "durability" sc0res.3~
RESULTS O F CORRELATION AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The results of four multiple regression analyses are discussed in this paper, one of them in detail. The dependent variables in the four analyses are, respectively, total magnitude of civil strife, magnitude of conspiracy, magnitude of internal war, and magnitude of turmoil. The correlations between the ten summary independent variables and these four strife measures are given in Table I . The independent variables all correlate with the dependent variables in the predicted direction, with the exception of coercive force size. The r's for the remaining nine independent variables are significant a t the .O1 level except for four correlates of internal war, three of which are significant a t the .05 level.
The hypothetical curvilinear relationship between coercive force size and total magnitude of strife (TMCS) is examined graphically in Figures 2 and 3 , each of which is a smoothed curve of deciles of the independent variable plotted against TMCS. Figure 2 , based on all 114 polities, suggests an apparent tendency, among countries with relatively small forces, for strife to increase with the size of those forces, and also a slight increase in TMCS a t very high levels of coercive forces.33 I t is quite 32 The following rescaling was used, the sum of the "durability" and "character" scores being given on the upper line, the final legitimacy score on the lower: Sum:
3,4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13,14 Eegitimacv: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 The S-shape of this relationship is considerably more pronounced when coercive-force size is related to total magnitude of turmoil; see Ted Gurr, "Why Urban Disorder? Perspectives from the Comparative Study of Civil Strife," American Behaz;ioral Scientist, 10 (March-April 1968).
likely that countries with protracted political violence expand their coercive forces to meet it. It also seems likely that armies in countries facing foreign threats cause less dissatisfaction-by their presence or actions-than armies in states not significantly involved in international conflict. Both factors might contaminate the proposed curvilinear relationship, so countries with either or both characteristics were removed and the relationship plotted for the remaining 69 countries; the results, in Figure 3 , show curvilinearity even more distinctly. Figure 4 indicates that the measure of coercive force potential, in which size is weighted for military loyalty to the regime, is essentially linear, as predicted. The latter measure is used in the multiple regression analyses, below.
Eight of the ten independent variables (excluding coercive force size and short-term deprivation, the sum of the two specific shortterm deprivation measures) are included in the multiple regression analyses summarized in Table 2 . The variables yield considerable and signiscant multiple correlation coefficients (R), including a high R of 3 0 6 for total magnitude of strife (R2=.650); a moderately high R for conspiracy of .630 (R2=.397); a similar R for internal war of .648 (R2= .420); and a somewhat lower R for turmoil of .533 (R2 = .284).34 There are several possible explanations for the finding that total magnitude of strife is accounted for nearly twice as well as the several forms of strife. One technical factor is that all the class-of-strife measures have greater distributional irregularities than does TMCS, 34 Significant computational errors in internal war and TMCS scores of several countries were identified and corrected after completion of the analyses reported here. Robert van den Helm of Princeton Universitv has analvzed the corrected data, using the combined short-term deprivation measure in lieu of the two separate measures, with these multiple regression results: for TMCS, R2=638; conspiracy, R2=.391; internal war, R2=.472; and turmoil, R2=.284. The significant increase in the degree of explanation for internal war is the result of increased correlations between magnitude of internal war and short-term deprivation (from .28 in Table 1 to .34); facilitation (from .57 to .61); and legitimacy (from -.23 to -.26). The r between magnit,udes of turmoil and internal war increases from .17 to .23, the r between TMCS and internal war from .79 to .%. No other results of the analyses reported here are significantly affected by the reanalysis. The actual TMCS scores shown in Table 3 are corrected ones. ( -) 8 Institutionalization ( -) 9 Past strife levels (+) 10 Facilitation (+) 11 Magnitude of conspiracy 12 Magnitude of internal war 13 Magnitude of turmoil 14 Total magnitude of strife Product moment correlation coefficients, multiplied by 100. Underlined r's are significant, for n =114, at the . O l level. Correlations between 18 and 23, inclusive, are significant at the .05 level.
b The proposed relationships between the independent variables, nos. 1 to 10, and the strife measures are shown in parentheses, the ri: for coercive force size signifying a proposed curvilinear relationship. Examination of the r's between the independent and dependent variables, in the box, shows that all are in the predicted direction with the anticipated exception of coercive force size, and that all but one are sitznificant at the .05 level.
Short-term deprivation is the sum of scores on the short-term economic and short-term political deprivation measures. The separate short-term deprivation measures were used in the regression analyses reported below; the summary measure was used in the causal inference analysis.
hence TMCS should be somewhat better ex-of internal wars, e.g., riots and localized replained. It is also possible that the categoriza-bellions in such polities as the Congo and South tion employed has less empirical merit than Vietnam, were categorized as aspects of the other work has suggested, i.e., that conspiracy, internal wars in these countries rather than internal war, and turmoil are not sharply turmoil per se. The most likely substantive distinct forms of civil strife. To qualify this interpretation of the relatively low predictapossibility, the correlation matrix in Table 1 bility of turmoil, however, is that much tursuggests that the forms of strife are only weakly moil is a response to a variety of locally-incirelated in magnitude-the highest r among the dent deprivations and social conditions of a eort three is 32-but it may still be that they are not represented in the indices used in this more strongly related in likelihood, and hence study. that the universe of strife is more homogenous
The multiple regression equation for total than the typology suggests. The least-predicted magnitude of strife was used to calculate preclass of strife-turmoil-might be better dicted magnitude of strife scores. Only ten accounted for if turmoil events in the context polities have predicted scores that differ from their actual scores by more than one standard deviation (7.70 units of TMCS). These polities, and three others that have discrepancies approaching one standard deviation, are listed in Table 3 . I n five of the thirteen polities-the Congo, Indonesia, Zambia, Rwanda, and Yementhere is probably systematic error from dataestimation procedures. All of these countries had intense but inadequately-reported civil violence for which only rough and quite possibly exaggerated estimates of deaths were available. When estimates of "wounded" were added to deaths estimates, using a ratio of about twelve to one based on better-reported but smallerscale events (see above), the result was alnlost certainly a gross inflation of actual casualties, and hence inflation of TMCS scores. The high actual TMCS score for Israel is the result of a questionable coding judgment about the extent and duration of extremist Orthodox religious conflict. More substantive questions are raised by some of the countries. Paraguay, Argentina, Ecuador, and Volta all could be argued to have had an unrealized potential for strife: in fact both Argentina and Ecuador experienced coups in the mid-1960's that according to their initiators were preventive or protective in nature, and early in 1966 the government of Volta succumbed to rioting followed by a coup. I n the Dominican Republic, the Congo, and Rwanda the unexpectedly high levels of violence followed the collapse of rigid, authoritarian regimes; one can infer a time-lag effect from the deprivation incurred under the old regimes. These are special explanations rather than general ones however. The lack of apparent substantive similarities among the thirteen poorly-predicted polities suggests that the analysis has included measures of most if not all the general determinants of magnitudes of civil strife.
IV. A REVISED CAUSAL MODEL
One striking result of the regression analyses is that the partial correlations ' of several of the variables tend to disappear when the other variables are introduced (see Table 2 ). The short-term deprivation measures consistently decline in consequence, in most instances falling below the .05 level of significance. Institutionalization is in all analyses controlled for by (Figures 2 and 3 ) and for deciles of countries with increasingly large coercive forces relative to their loyalty. The range of TMCS scores for the 114polities is 0.0 to 48.7, their mean 9.0, and their standard deviation 7.7. Units on the horizontal axes represent numbers of cases, not proportional increases in force size/loyalty; the figures represent the scores of the extreme cases. Eleven rather than ten groupings of cases were used in computations for Figures 2 and 4 ; the curves of all three figures were smoothed by averaging successive pairs of decile scores. Simple correlations from Table 1 are repeated here to facilitate comparisons. ~artial'correlations in parentheses have standard (beta) weights that are significant at less than the .05 level, using the one-tailed T test with n =114. Since this analysis is concerned with what is, effectively, the entire universe of polities, all the correlations are in one sense "significant," but those in parentheses are of substantially less consequence than the others. The weights are reported to facilitate comparisons of the relative importance of the independent variables: because of the use of a variety of scaling and combination procedures for both independent and dependent variables, the weights do not permit direct interpretations, for example, of the effects of a one-unit decrease in intensity of economic discrimination on extent of turmoil. the other variables. One or the other of the two facilitation variables declines to zero in each analysis, "past levels of strife" vanishing in three of the four. Coercive potential and legitimacy also decline in their relation to strife rather sharply. The only variable that is consistently unaffected by the introduction of the control variables specified by the model is persisting deprivation. A preliminary analysis of the behavior of first-and second-order partials suggests what causal interactions and sequences may be involved in these results. The causal path analysis is concerned principally with the sources of the total magnitude of strife, examining the causal sequences of the the specific forms of strife only when they appear to deviate from that of all strife. variables intervened separately and simultaneously between deprivation and strife. The results indicate that this supposition is only partly correct: none of the mediating variables appear to affect the relationship between persistkng deprivation and strife, i.e., there is a certain inevitability about the association between such deprivation and strife. Persisting deprivation is moreover equally potent as a source of conspiracy, internal war, and turmoil. With the partial and weak exception of institutionalization, no patterns of societal arrangements nor coercive potential that are included in the model have any consistent effect on its impact.
The effects of short-term deprivation on strife are substantially different-and, it should he added, uncorrelated with persisting deprivation. The intervening variables do tend to control for short-term deprivation's effects. To determine which one or ones exercise primary control, first-order partials were calculated for the several postulated intervening variables. with these results.
-1) The simple r between short-term deprivation and strife = .4g3" 2) The partial r bewhen the control varitween short term able is: deprivation and strife is: Institutionalization Legitimacy Past strife Facilit,a,tion Coercive potential 3nly the last two constitute a significant reduction, and moreover when they are combined, the second-order partial, rds. i,, = 2 7 , i.e., coercive potential and facilitation are the only consequential intervening variables affecting the outcome of short-term deprivation. Shortterm deprivation taken alone accounts for (.4Q2=.23 of the magnitude of strife; controlling for coercive potential and facilitation reduces the proportion of strife directly accounted for to (.27)2=.07, a relatively small but still significant amount.
The same controlling effects of coercive potential and facilitation on short-term deprivation occur among the three generic forms of strife. I t is worth noting that when the mediating variables are controlled, short-term economic deprivation still accounts directly for a 36 TO simplify evaluation of the effects of the control variables, the summary short-term deprivation variable was employed rather than its economic and political components separately. portion of strife, internal war in particular, while political deprivation contributes significantly to conspiracy. These relationships may reflect contamination of the independent and dependent variables because of their partial temporal overlap. Some short-term economic deprivation in the early 1960's may be attributable to protracted internal wars, and successful conspirators may impose politicallydepriving policies once they are in power. The relationship between short-term deprivation of both types and the magnitude of turmoil, however, is effectively mediated or controlled by characteristics of the society and its response to strife.
The relationships among the mediating variables remain to be examined. Institutionalization has no significant relation to any measure of strife when the other variables are controlled, and in the case of magnitude of total strife and of internal war a weak positive relationship emerges, i.e., there is a slight though not statistically significant tendency for high institutionalization to be associated with higher levels of strife. A computation of partials between institutionalization and the other three mediating variables indicates that institutionalization has a preceding or causal relationship both to coercive potential and to the facilitation variables, as shown in the revised model ia Figure 3 . Polities with high levels of institutionalization tend to have high coercive potentla1 and to have fen-of the conditions that facilitate strife. Legztimacy al~parently has a causal relationship with strife independent either of deprivation or the other intervening variables. About half of the initial correlation between legitimacy and strife is accounted for by tlie apparent causal rcslation between legitimacy and coelcive potential, i.e., legitmate regimes tend to have large and, most importantly, loyal military and police establishments. Separately from this, however, high legitimzcy is significantly associated with low levels of strife, a finding consistrnt with the postulate that political legitimacy itself is a desired value, one nhose absence constitutes a deprivation that incites men to take violent action against their regimes. The I ( kitionship is relatively strongest for total m:\g~iitude of strife, less so for turmoil and conspiracy, and inconsequential for internal war
Coercive polrrztial appears In several respects to be a crucial variable in the revised causal model: it is evidently attributable in part to both lei-els of institutionalization and of legitimacy, and has a major mediating effect on short-term tieprivation. Nonetheless, when all variahles arc controlled (see Table 3 ), the partial r betnccxn coercive potential and strife is sharply reduced, in two iristancej below the .05 level of sigrlificance. This is in part due to the effects of legitimacy, which is causally linked to both strife and coercive potential.37 The other major intervening variable is facilitation (re,= v . 5 2 ; r,,.f= -.40, where c = coercive potential, s=strife, and f =social and structural facilitation), i.e., whether or not facilitative conditions exist for civil strife is partly dependent upon the coercive potential of the regime, and thus indirectly dependent upon legitimacy as well. (The relationship is evidently betwren coercive potential on the j 7 Analysis of the correlation coefficients does not indicate dei~riitively that legitimacy contributes to coercive potential rather than vice versa; nor would it be impossible to argue, on the basis of the partial r's alone, that short-term deprivation is a weak intervening variable between coercive potential and facilitation, on the one hand, and strife on the other. It is the plausibility of the theoretical arguments, in each case, that gives deciding force to the interpretation proposed. one hand and the "Communist party status" and the "external support for initiators" components of facilitation on the other; coercive potential cannot have any consequential effects on "physical inaccessibility.") This completes the revision of the causal model with the exception of the second component of facilitation, past strife levels. This variablb has a consistently lower relationship with strife than other variables, with the exception of the turmoil analysis. Rloreover its partial correlation is reduced to zero in theje analyses, with the same exception, the sole significant controlliiig variable being social and structural facilitation. Arnong the causes of turmoil, however, social and structural facilitation is controlled for by several variablesprincipally past strife, coercive potential, and institutionalization-whereas past strife remains significant when other effects are partialled out. Both findings support the theoretical argument that suggested the "past strife" measure: a history of chronic strife apparently reflects, and contributes to, attitudes that directly facilitate future turmoil, and indirectly acts to facilitate general levels of strife.
The revised model, with proportional weighta inserted, is sketched in Figure 5 . The most proximate and potent variable is social and structural facilitation, which accounts fol. nearly half the explained variance. The deprivation variables account directly for over onethird the magnitude of strife, legitimacy and institutionalization for one-eighth. But theie proportions refer only to direct effects, and in the cabe of both coercive potential and facilitation part of that direct effect, i.e., the illicit participation of the military in strife and the provision of foreign support for initiators, can be determined only from the characteristics of strife itsclf.38 The more remote causes of strife, namely deprivation, institutionalization, legitimacy, and prior strife, are the more fundamental and persisting ones. Some additional regressiorl analyses provide some comparisons. Four of the independent variables relate to inferred states of mind: the two short-term deprivation measures, persisting deprivation, and legitimacy. The R based on these variables is .65, compared with .81 when the remaining four variables are added. The R based on the three deprivation varial~les alone is .60. These analyses show that all "states-of-mind" conditions contribute significantly to magnitude of strife, but that long-term deprivation has a partial controlling effect on political deprivation. The inference is that short-term political deprivation as indexed in this study, is most likely to lend to strife if it iununa:e, nith conditions of persisting deprivation.
We can also ask, and answer, the question, To what extent do the remaining four mediating conditions alone account for magnitude of strife? The variables coercive potential, facilitation, institutionalization, and past strife give a mu1til)le R of .73, with almost all the explained variance accounted for by the first two variables. This result should provide aid and comfort to those concerned with "levels of analysis" problems: research of this sort can focus on aggregative, societal characteristicswhich the mediating variables represent-and the (inferred) psychological level can be ignored n ith relatively little loss of statistical explanatory power. K h y these variables are strongly operative and others, like levels of development and type of political system, are relatively weak still needs answering; the answer may be to treat pqychological variables 38 Tanter has examined time-lag effects between a number of measures of foreign economic and military assistance for the regime and mngnitude of civil violence in 1961-63 for Latin American nations and finds generally weak relationships. The only consequential positive relationship, an indirect one, is between levels of U.S. military assistance and subsequent strife. Raymond Tanter, "Toward A Theory of Conflict Behavior in Latin America." (Paper read to the International Political Science Association, Brussels, September, 1967). as unoperationalized assumptions, or to replace them with variables whose rationale is strictly in terms of effects of social structure or processes on stability.
A further problem is identification of the set of variables that provides the most parsimonious account of magnitude of civil strife. As one approach to the answer, Figure 5 implies that three variables call be eliminated: coercive potential, institutionalization, and past strife, all of which have no consequeiitial direct effects on T X C S The remaining five variables-the "state of mind" variables and facilitation-give an R of .80 and R2 of .64, results almost identical to those obtained when all eiqht variables are included.39 Four of the five variables included contribute substantially to the regression equation; as expected, the effects of short-term deprivatiolz, political deprivation in particular, are partially controlled. One important observation is that social and structural facilitation, though it is substantially the strongest explanatory variahle,40 has here, as in Figure 5 , only a moderate direct controlling effect on short-term deprivation. One interpretation is that some of the effects of facilitation on ThSCS are independent of deprivation. Two of its three component measures, Communist Party status and external support for initiators, have in common a "tactical" element, i.e., one can infer that undcrlying them are calculations about gains to be achieved through the employment of strife. This tactical element is not wholly independent of deprivation, inasmuch as three of the four correlations between facilitation and deprivation measures are significant, ranging from .I7 to .34 (see Table  I ). The basic proposition of this study, that relative deprivation is a necessary precondition for strife, is not challenged by these observations. They do, however, suggest that tactical motives for civil strife are of sufficient importance that they deserve separate operational attention comparable to the conceptual attention given them by conflict theorists.41
I n a reanalysis using corrected data (see footnote 34), four variables-the combined shortterm deprivation measure, persisting deprivation, legitimacy, and facilitation-given an RZof .629. A number of additional causal inference analyses can be made which might lead to modifications of these conclusions, and of the causal model in Figure 5 . Other articles will report the results of causal analyses of various subsets of the universe of polities, and of the causal sequences that can be identified for the several forms of strife.4" V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION Quantitative comparative research cannot flourish in a theoretical vacuum, even if it makes use of an armamentarium of techniques of causal inference. This article may not be proof of that assertion, but it should suggest the usefulness of beginning with a theoretical model based on previous substantive work. The theoretical model of the causes of civil strife employed here dictated the construction of a number of aggregate indicators of noteasily-operationalized variables for 114 polities. Eight summary indicators proved to account jointly for two-thirds the variance among nations in relative magnitudes of civil strife during 1961-65 (R2=.65). Of greater theoretical consequence, the initial analysis of partial correlation coefficients makes possible a number of more precise statements about the causal interactions among the theoretical variables.
The fundamental proposition that strife varies directly in magnitude with the intensity of relative deprivation is strongly supported; the three deprivation variables alone provide an R of .6O (R2 = .36), and when a fourth state-of-mind variable, legitimacy, is added the R2 increases to .43. One criticism of this research, and of other cross-national studies of strife that make inferences about collective manifestations of psychological variables, is that the results are not a "direct" test of the relevance of such variables, since the indices of psychological variables are derived from aggregate data rather than being obtained, for example, from cross-national surveys. I t is unquestionably necessary to test all hypotheses, including psychological ones, in a variety of ways, for example to determine of Social ConJlict (New York: The Free Press, 1956); and Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of ConJlict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960) .
42 See Gurr, "Why Urban Disorder?" for a causal inference analysis of the sources of turmoil. The turmoil model differs principally in that "past strife levels" has the primary mediating role tha,t facilitation has in the TMCS model. whether the inferentially-deprived groups are those most likely to engage in strife, and to ask highly frustrated individuals whether they would, or have, taken part in collective violence. No scientific proposition is ever directly confirmed or disconfirmed, but some tests are less indirect than others. However, there is only one scientifically acceptable alternative to regzrding the results reported here as strong indirect evidence for the psychological propositions relating deprivation and legitimacy to civil violence. That is G o provide some reasonably parsimonious, alternative explanations (substantive or technical) of the fact that indices of inferred collective states of mind account for two-thirds of the explaiiied variance (43 percent compared with 65 percent for all variables) in total magnitude of strife.
The effects of the intervening or mediating variables on the disposition to civil violence proved considerably more complex than those of the deprivation variables. Regime legitimacy apparently has no consequential mediating effect on deprivation but acts much as deprivation itself does: low levels of legitimacy, or by inference feelings of illegitimacy, apparently motivate men to collective violence. Levels of institutionalization, as reflected in high levels of unionization, party system stability, and large public sectors, have no direct mediating effect on deprivation; they are however important determinants of coercive potential and of social facilitation, variables which in turn crucially affect the outcome of short-term deprivation. Social and structural facilitation is the most potent of the intervening variables and appears to have some independent effect on magnitudes of strife. One inference is that the index of this variable reflects tactical decisions to engage in strife as a means of goal attainment. The measure of past levels of strife, 1946-1959 , provides a partial test of what nzight be called the null hypotheses of human conflict, that the best predictor of future conflict is the level of past conflict.43 The measure has relatively weak relationships with magnitude of strife measures for 1961-65 and is an important mediating variable only among the causes of turmoil.
One striking finding is that nations' levels of persisting deprivation are consistently and directly related to their levels of strife. Depri- 43 The test is less than precise because the measures are not comparable; the past strife measure is based on an arbitrary weighting of counts of number of events, whereas the magnitude of strife measures reflect levels of participation, duration, and intensity.
vation attributable to such conditions as discrimination, political separatism, economic dependence, and religious cleavages tends to contribute at a relatively moderate but constant rate to civil strife whatever may be done to encourage, deter, or divert it, short only of removing its underlying conditions. One other result has important implications for theory, and also for policy, if it is supported by further research. The relation between coercive force size (the relative size of military and internal security forces) and the magnitude of civil violence is distinctly curvilinear: as the level of resources devoted to coercive forces increases, the magnitude of violence also tends to increase up to a certain point, and only a t relatively high levels of coercive force does strife tend to decline. Moreover a t the outer limit the relationship again tends to change direction: countries with the very largest coercive forces tend to have more strife than those with somewhat smaller forces. When one eliminates from analysis the countries that have experienced protracted internal or external conflict, the basic curvilinear relationship remains. The adage that force solves nothing seems supported; in fact force may make things worse.
